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Cavin and Rush: Admiralty Law

ADMIRALTY LAW
THE UNSEAWORTHINESS DOCTRINE AND
SEAMAN'S ASSAULT: NAVIGATING THE
MUDDY WATERS
LYLE C. CAVIN, JR., EsQ.-

L

AND

PmuP A RUSH--

INTRODUCTION

A. THE PURPosE
This article will propose a set of guideposts or factors for
use by the Ninth Circuit in determining a vessel owners liability
under the unseaworthiness doctrine for assaults inflicted by one
crew member upon another. It will also be suggested that some
degree of serious injury must be found before imposing liability
under the doctrine. Additionally, the authors recommend what
will be termed the "fighting seaman" stereotype be dropped in
assessing the assaulting seaman's disposition.
Although primary emphasis is placed on Ninth Circuit decisions, an analysis of other Circuits will be made as a comparison
and to provide background for this subject. Additionally, it
should be noted that personal injury claims resulting from shipboard ass&ult may generally state three causes of action:1 1) un• J.D. Golden Gate Univenity, 1969. Mr. Cavin ha been • pnc:tjciDr attorney in
Sau Frmc:i:sco lor the pat 18 yeua. apecia1 izinc in RaIDeD'. peraooal injury and JoocsboremenI'barbo worker compenqtioo daima.
•• Third yeM IbJdent, Golden Gate UDivenity Sc:booI of Law, CIa. of 1988. Mr.
Rush is • araduate of the California Maritime Academy (eta. of 1979) and
aboud United State. ftac ftIIela _ • dedt officer lor six )'NIL
L 8ft pnerally 1B S. BatM~ A. hHMa. B. CIwm. J. Loo.AHD H. PmvAL, BaGMer OM Amim.u.T't J .. at 1-22 (1986) (bereinafter Baa:Dler OM ADlaa.u.T't).
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sp,aworthiness~ 2) negligence (Jones Act);a and 3) maintenance
and cure.4 However, 88 this article focuses on unseaworthiness,
issues arising under the negligence and maintenance and cure
claims will only be discussed in broad terms.

B.

OvERVIEW

The warranty of seaworthiness provides that the shipowner
has a non-delegable dutya to provide the crew with a vessel and
gear in seaworthy condition, such that the vessel and appurtenant equipment are reasonably fit for their intended purpose.'
The warranty is absolute and completely divorced from concepts
of negligence.' As applied to crew members the shipowner warrants the seaman to be of equal disposition and seamanship to
ordinary men in the calling.'
The above rule reflects a strong policy recognizing the inherently hazardous conditions a seaman is continuously subjected to in his work environment.· As such, the Court has determined under proper circumstance that the shipowner is better
2. For a general discussion on the unseaworthiness claim. &ee G. GU.NORB AND C.
LAw or ADMIRALTY § 6-38, at 383 (2d. ed. 1975) [hereinafter Gu.wOKB &

BLACK. TIm
BLACK).

3. 46 U.s.C. § 688 (1982). See generally GU.NORB & BLACK, &upra note 2, § 6-20, at
325. Aho &ee BBNBDICT ON ADMIRALTY, &upra note I, § 2, at 1-7.
4. For a general discussion on maintenance and cure, &ee Gu.wORB & BLACK, &upra
note 2, § 6-6, at 281. See aho BBNBDICT ON ADMIRALTY, &upra note I, § 42, at 4-5.
5. Mahnich v. Southern S.s. Co.. 321 U.s. 96, 102 (1944).
6. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.s. 539, 550 (1960).
7. Delivering the opinion for the Court, Justice Rutledge discusses the absolute nature of unseaworthiness:
It is essentially a species of liability without fault, analogous
to other well lcnown instances in our law. Derived from and
shaped to meet the hazards which performing the service imposes, the liability is neither limited by conceptions of negligence nor contractual in character. (citations omitted). It is a
form of absolute duty owing to all within the ran!1e of its humanitarian policy.
Seas Shipping v. Sieracki, 328 U.s. 85, 94-95 (1946).
See aho Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 500 (1971), where the Court
distinguishes between personal acta of instantaneous negligence and negligence in creating an unseaworthy condition.
S. Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.s. Co., 348 U.s. 336, 337 (1955), approving Keen v.
Overseas Tanbhip Corp., 194 F.2d 515, 518 (1952).
9. Mahnich v. Southern S.s. Co., 321 U.s. 96, 103-04 (1944). See aho infra note 30
and accompanying text.
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suited to pass the risk of loss to the shipping community (who
benefits from the seaman's services), rather than imposing the
brunt of loss solely on the injured seaman.10
In determining whether the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness has been breached by the assaulting seaman, the Supreme Court in Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. CO.,II stated:
The problem, as with many aspects of the law, is
one of degree. Was the assault within the usual
and customary standards of the calling? Or is it a
case of a seaman with a wicked disposition, a propensity to evil conduct, a savage and vicious nature? If it is the former, it is one of the risks of
the sea that every crew takes. If the seaman has a
savage and vicious nature, then the ship becomes
a perilous place. A vessel bursting at the seams
might well be a safet place than one with a homicidal maniac as a crew member.I i

In plying the murky waters of unseaworthiness the following
discussion will attempt to assist the Ninth Circuit in distinguishing between liability and non-liability under the doctrine.
For this purpose the remainder of the article will be divided into
three main topic headings: 1) history and development of the
unseaworthiness doctrine; 2) a main discussion of proposals; and
3) a conclusion.
ll. HISTORY AND DEVELOPEMENT

A EVOLUTION OF THE UNSEAWOR"I:HINESS DOCTRINE IN RELATION
TO SEAMAN'S PERSONAL INJURY
The modem doctrine of unseaworthiness as applied to
seamen's personal injury has evolved over a period of centuries. 1S The exact origins of the doctrine are unclear, although
10. Seas Shipping v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1946). See also infril notes 31 and
39 with accompanying text.
11. 348 U.S. 336 (1955).
12. ld. at 340.
13. For a general discussion on the history of the unseaworthiness doctrine in regard
to seamen's personal injury, ,ee Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, 326 U.s. 539, 543-550 (1960).
See also generally BENEDICT ON ADUIRALTY, ,upra note I, § 23, at 3-16. Additionally, ,ee
CHAJoILEE, THE ABsoLtmI: WARRANTY or SEAWORTHINESS: A HJsroay AND CoMPARATIVE
STUDY, 24 MERCER L. REv. 519, 528-29 (1973).
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mention of it may be found in the early sea codes of continental
Europe.lf These codes dealt with the seaman's right to maintenance and cure when injured in the service of the vesselIa
During the early 19th century, American courts extended
the doctrine to encompass the seaman's wage claim for abandonment of an unseaworthy vesselU During the later part of that
century the doctrine was further extended to recovery for personal injury.17 These early cases imposed a negligence "due diligence" standard on the shipowner to provide a seaworthy vessel.l l Under the negligence standard a seaman could not recover
for injuries caused by a hazardous condition of which the vessel's owner or ship's officers were neither actually nor constructively aware. lit
Courts recognizing the seaman's unique and inherently hazardous work environment began to unravel the negligence strand
from the unseaworthiness claim beginning with the famous Osceola dicta in 1903.'0 In the subsequent case of Carlisle Packing
Co. v. Sandanger,Sl the Court suggested that the vessel in question may have been unseaworthy at the time she left the dock
without regard to negligence.is This was taken by subsequent
courts and commentators as imposing an absolute duty on the
part of the shipowner detached from any concepts of
negligence.2lI
14. Michell, 362 u.s. at 543.
15. ld. at 543.
16. ld. at 544.
17.ld.
la ld.
19. See BENEllIcr ON ADWlRALTY, 8upra note I, § 23. at 3-19.
20. Although suLjed to much debate, considering the historical context of the opinion, Justice Brown, states in dicta:
Upon full review, however, of English and American authorities upon these questions, we believe the law may be considered 88 settled upon the following propoeitions:
2. That the vessel and her owner are, both by English and
American law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received by
seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of ship or a
failure to supply and keep in order the proper app1ianC7~ appurtenant to the ship.[etation omitted].
The Osceola, 189 U.s. 158, 175 (1903).
21. 259 U.s. 255 (1922).
22. ld. at 259.
23. See generally discussion of unseaworthinesa after the Osceola in Mitchell v.
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By 1944, the Supreme Court in Mahnich v. Southern S.S.
Co.," set the course for the modem day doctrine of seaworthiness regarding personal injury recovery, by expressly stating its
suggestion in Carlisle Packing CO.,A that the shipowner has an
absolute duty to provide a seaworthy vessel without' regard to
negligence. From Mahnich and subsequent refinements, the
modem rule of seaw.orthiness may be stated as a non-delegable
duty" by the shipowner to provide the crew with a vessel and
gear in a seaworthy condition, such that the vessel is reasonably
fit for her intended purpose.S7 This duty is absolute and completely divorced from concepts of negligence.A
The strong policy behind the rule recognizes that seamen
are generally powerless" to protect themselves from the inherent hazards of their living and work environment.at) Risk of loss
Trawler Racer, 362 U.s. 539, 545-550 (1960).
24. 321 U.s. 96 (1944).
25. rd. at 100·02.
26. rd. at 102.
'J:1. Mitchell, 362 U.s. at 550.
28. See infra note 8.
29. 46 USC § 11501 (1983) provides in relevant pam:
Penalties for specified offenses..
When a seaman lawfully engaged commits any of the fol·
lowing offenses, the seaman shall be punished as specified:
(4) For willful disobedience to a lawful command at sea,
the seaman, at the discretion of the master, may be confiDed
until the disobedience ends, and on arrival in port forfeits
from the seaman's wages not more than "' days payor, at the
discretion of the court, may be imprisoned for not more than
one month.
(5) For continued willful disobedience to a lawful com·
mand or continued willful neglect at sea, the seaman, at the
discretion of the master, may be confined, on water and 1,000
calories, with run rations every 5th day, until the disobedience
ends, and on arrival in port forfeits, for each 24 hours' contino
uance of the disobedience or neglect. not more than 12 days'
payor, at the discretion of the court, may be imprisoned for
not more than 3 months.
(6) For assaulting a master, mate, pilot, engineer, or staff
officer, the seaman shall be imprisoned for not more than 2
years.
30. In discussing the underlying policy of the unseaworthiness doctrine, Justice
Stone states:
We have often had occuion to emphasize the conditions of the
seaman's employment (citation omitted), which have been
deemed to make him a ward of the admiralty and to place a
large responsibility for his safety on the owner. He is subject
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for injuries resulting from hazardous conditions will pass to the
shipOwner who spreads the loss to the shipping industry as a
whole, which benefits from the seaman's services under hazardous conditions.'1 It was against this backdrop that the courts began extending the warranty of seaworthiness to include the
ship's crew.
.

B.

THE UNSEAWORTHINESS DOCTRINE AND A$SAULT BETWEEN CREW

MEMBERS

In Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp.," the plaintiff originally brought suit under an unseaworthiness and negligence
claim for injuries resulting from an unprovoked attack with a
meat cleaver by a fellow crew member." Judge Learned Hand
reversed the district court judgment for defendant and ordered a
new triaL" Noting the general warranty of seaworthiness extended to both patent and latent defects in the vessel's hull and
to the rigorous discipline of the sea, and all the conditions of
hiJ ae:vice constrain him to accept. without critical examination and without protest. working conditiona and appliances as
commanded by his superior officers. These conditions. which
have generated the exacting requirement that the veaael or the
owner must provide the seaman with seaworthy appliances
with which to do his work. likewise require that safe appliances be furniahed when and where the work is to be done.
Mahnich v. Southern S.s. Co., 321 U.s. 96, 103-04 (1944).
31. In d!acuaaing the shipowner/crew member relationship, Justice Rutledge, delivering the opinion for the Court. stated:
[The] helplessness of [seamen] to ward off [marine hazards]
and the harahness of forcing them to shoulder alone the resulting personal disability and looa. have been thought to justify and to require putting their burden, in so far u it is measurable in money, upon the owner regardleu of hiJ fault
[footnote]. Those risb are avoidable by the owner to the extent that they may result from negligence. ADd beyond this he
is in poeition, as the worker is not. to distribute the 10lIl in the
shipping community which receives the service and should
bear ita cost.
These and other considerations arising from the hazards
which maritime service placea upon men who perform it.
rather than any consensual baai.a of responsibility, have been
the paramount inBuences dictating the shipowner" liability
for unseaworthiness as well as ita absolute character.
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.s. 85, 93-94 (1946).
32. 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1952).
33. Ide at 516.
34. Ide at 519.
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gear Judge Hand stated:
[W] e can see no reason for saying that, although
the owner is liable if the ship's plates35 are started
without his knowledge, he is not liable if he signs
on a homicidal paranoiac, whose appearance does
not betray his disposition. 36

In extending the warranty of seaworthiness to include the
vessel's crew, Judge Hand stated that the warranty was "not
that the seaman is competent to meet all contingencies; but that
he is equal in disposition and seamanship to ordinary men in the
calling."37 Thus, if the assaulting seaman's disposition fell below
that of the ordinary seaman, his unequal disposition constitutes
a "defective" condition for which the shipowner will be held
strictly liable.

Consistent with the policy as stated in Mahnich and subsequent decisions,38 the court stressed that the injured seaman
should not bear the risk of loss as a result of an inherently dangerous condition (the unequally disposed seaman), even where
the owner had used due diligence in selecting a crew.39 Risk of
35. A "plate" generally refers to a fiat piece of steel used in shipbuilding. Its name
will vary depending on use (e.g., "tank top plating", plating used to form the top of a
double bottom; or "deck plating", plating used to form the deck). "Plates", as Judge
Hand used the term, appears to refer to the hull plating or plating that forms the skin of
the ship. See generally E. TuRPIN AND W. McEWEN, MERCHANT MARINE OFFICERS' HANDBOOK, at 14-32 (1965), and W. EDDINGTON. GLOSSARY OF SHIPBUILDING AND OUTFITTING
TERMS, at 210 (1944).
36. Id. at 518.
37.Id.
38. See supra notes 30 and 31.
39. Judge Learned Hand, speaking to fears that adoption of such a rule would shut
down the shipping industry, states:
As for the fears of the judge [in adopting this rule] in the case
at bar which we have just mentioned, we can see no antecedent reason to assume that after the owner has used due care
in selecting the crew, they will in many instances turn out not
to be up to the ordinary measure of the calling. But suppose
there will be many such instances; that is no reason why an
individual seaman who has suffered because his fellow is not
up to his work, must bear the loss. Substantially all maritime
risks are insured, and if we must suppose that the addition of
this risk will show in the premiums, in the end it will show in
freight rates; and so far as it does, the recovery will be spread
among those who use the ships. As we have said, this has been
the uniform practice when the injury has arisen from defects
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loss is passed to the shipowner and any increase in freight fares,
as a result of increased insurance premiums, would be spread
among those who use such services.40
A qualification to Keen appeared the following year in
Jones v. Lykes Bros. S.S. CO.41 In Jones, the plaintiff seaman
brought an unseaworthiness claim for injuries sustained when
his roommate beat him, resulting in a broken hip.42 The beating
took place without apparent provocation although the two had
argued several hours earlier.43 The trial court held the roommate
was of unequal disposition under the Keen standard, thus
breaching the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness.44
On appeal Judge Learned Hand reversed. 41i Finding the
owner would not be held liable for every "sailors' brawl",46 the
court refined the meaning of the seaman's disposition by stating
that:
[A]ll men are to some degree irascible ...
[but] ... [s]ailors lead a rough life and are more
apt to use their fists than office employees; what
will seem to sedentary and protected persons an
insufficient provocation for a personal encounter,
is not the measure of the "disposition" of "the ordinary men in the calling."47

In other words, what may appear to an office worker insufficient provocation for a fist fight, could be sufficient provocation
for a seaman. Thus, Jones added a new qualification in assessing
the assaulting seaman's disposition.

In conclusion, the court found the assailant had not
breached the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness.48 Additionin material; and we have yet to learn that hull and gear are
less likely to fail under stress than those who handle both.
Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1952).
40.Id.
41. 204 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1953).
42. Id. at 817.
43. Id. at 816.
44.Id.
45. Id. at 817.
46.Id.
47. Id. at 817.
48. Id. In reversing Judge Hand states: "Such a set-to seldom results in serious in-
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ally, the court noted in other cases of this type, a prior history of
violent behavior, use of a weapon, or worse, had been shown
before liability was imposed.49 Keen and Jones became the foundation cases for the Supreme Court in Boudoin two years later.
In Boudoin, a heavily intoxicated crew member snuck into
the plaintiff's room to steal a bottle of liquor.llo When the plaintiff awoke the assailant beat him over the head with a bottle
causing severe injuries.lIl Shortly after the attack the assailant
came back with a knife intending to inflict further injury on the
plaintiff. 1I2 Mter threatening the mate, the assailant left the vessel without permission to obtain more alcohol.II3 The master
eventually placed him in irons and subsequently discharged him
from the vessel. lI4
In affirming the trial court's finding of unseaworthiness the
Court stated:
We see no reason to draw a line between the ship
and the gear on the one hand and the ship's personnel on the other [footnote]. A seaman with a
proclivity for assaulting people may, indeed, be a
more deadly risk than a rope with a weak strand
or a hull with a latent defect. GG

Attempting to draw a line between breach and non-breach
of warranty, the Court distinguished between "an assault within
the usual and customary standards of the calling" and one comjury, when only fists are used, and we are to judge Hunter's disposition, not by the fact
that the plaintiff broke his hip, but by what would ordinarily follow from what he did."
Id. at 817.
Curiously, it would appear from the majority of subsequent case law that the facts in
Jones would result in breach of warranty. See, e.g., infra, note 73 and accompanying
text.
See also, T. SCHOENBAUM. ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW, (1987), §53, at 167, where
proximate causation under the unseaworthiness doctrine is viewed in the traditional
sense, such that: "(1) the unseaworthiness played a substantial part in bringing about or
actually causing the injury and that (2) the injury was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the unseaworthiness."
49. Id.
50. Boudoin, 348 U.S. at 337.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 338.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 339.
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mitted by "a seaman with a wicked disposition, a propensity to
evil conduct, a savage and vicious nature."56 If the former, the
seaman bore the risk of 10ss.57 If the latter, the shipowner bore
the risk. 58 The Court additionally adopted the Jones qualification in assessing the seaman's disposition such that it must be
bore in mind that seamen are more easily provoked than office
workers. 59
The trial court found the assailant of unequal disposition by
evidence that he was "a person of violent character, belligerent
disposition, excessive drinking habits, disposed to fighting and
making threats and assaults."60 The Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court decision, finding the assailant had crossed the line,
and breached the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness. 61,
III. MAIN DISCUSSION

A.

AIDS TO NAVIGATION

1.

Analogy to criminal "aggravated assault"

One of the simpler rules of prudent navigation is to know
where you are and where you are going. The discussion up to
this point has focused on the first part of our prudent navigation
rule, where are we?
The Court in Boudoin, asks us to distinguish between "an
assault within the usual and customary standards of the calling"
commonly referred to as the "sailors' brawl",62 and the case of
56. [d. at 340.
57. [d.

58. [d.
59. [d. at 339, citing to Jones with approval.
60. Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 112 F. Supp. 177 (E.D. La. 1953), rev'd, 221
F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. granted, 348 U.S. 336 (1955).
61. Boudoin, 348 U.S. at 340.
62. [d. at 339. It would appear that "sailors' brawl" is a term of art not susceptible
to easy definition. In Jones v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 204 F.2d 815, 816 (2d Cir. 1953), the
court stated a shipowner would not be liable for "injuries resulting from every sailors'
brawl." Interpreting this statement, one might conclude if the shipowner is not liable for
injuries resulting from every "sailors' brawl," then there might be some sailors' brawls
where he is liable. Whatever Judge Hand meant by "sailors' brawl", some courts have
equated it with an "assault within the usual and customary standards of the calling."
See Stechcon v. United States, 439 F.2d 972, 794 (9th Cir. 1971), where the court states
"[tJhe record before us conclusively shows that appellant's injuries were not sustained in
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an assault where the assailant possesses "a wicked disposition, a
propensity to evil conduct, a savage and vicious nature."63 In
breaking this proposition down into components, lets first begin
with the term "assault".
Assault is often used as a generic term for the two distinct
actions of assault and battery.54 Assault in terms of a specific
tort, is intent to inflict apprehension of a harmful or offensive
contact, where battery is the actual physical completion of the
assault. 65
a 'sailor's brawl'••.•" See also Hildebrand v. S.S. Commander, 247 F. Supp. 625, 627
(E.D. Va. 1965).
63. Boudoin, 348 U.S. at 340.
64. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 10, at 46 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS]:
The two terms [of assault and battery] are so closely associated in common usage that they are generally used together,
or regarded as more or less synonymous [footnote]. Loosely
drawn criminal statutes, which make use of "assault" to include·attempted battery, or even battery itself, have assisted
in obscuring the distinction.
See also, W. LA FAYE AND A SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW, § 7.14(a), at 684 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter LA FAYE]:
(a) Assault and Battery Distinguished.
Although the word "assault" is sometimes used loosely to include a battery, and the whole expression "assault and battery" to mean battery [footnote], it is more accurate to distinguish between the two separate crimes, assault and battery, on
the basis of the existence or non-existence of physical injury
or offensive touching. Battery requires such an injury or
touching. Assault, on the other hand, needs no such physical
contact ...•
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (2d ed. 1965):
Section 13. Battery: Harmful Contact
An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and
(b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly
or indirectly results.
See also 3 E. DEVITT, C. BLACKMAR AND M WOLFF, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 81.01, at 196 (4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS]:
Intentional Tort - "assault" - "battery" - defined.
The law protects the physical integrity of every person
from all unnecessary and unwarranted violation or
interference.
Any intentional attempt or threat to inflict injury upon
the person of another, when coupled with an apparent present
ability to do so, and an intentional display of force such as
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Assuming the shipboard assault includes both intent to
cause offensive touching and actual offensive touching66 then
"an assault within the usual and customary standards of the
calling," must in the minimum, be some type of battery.67 If this
first type of assault is a battery, then the second type of assault
of which the Court speaks, must also a battery, but with something mor_e. Something more, the Court tells us is "a wicked disposition, a propensity to evil conduct, a savage and vicious
nature."68
Focusing on the assaulting seaman's disposition the Court
appears to be looking for a greater evil intent on the part of the
assaulting seaman before finding him "defective" in terms of the
warranty of seaworthiness. However, in determining intent we
must focus on the circumstances surrounding the assault and the
resulting harm.69
would give the victim reason to fear or expect immediate bodily harm, constitutes an "assault." An "assault" may be committed without actually touching, or striking, or doing bodily
harm to the person of another.
Any intentional use of force upon the person of another is
a "battery." So, the least intentional touching of the person of
another, if accompanied by an intentional use or display of
force such as would give the victim reason to fear or expect
immediate bodily harm, constitutes a "battery."
See also, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 64, at 39.
66. Nearly all cases in this area involve some degree of intentional offensive contact.
See, e.g., cases cited infra note 73.
67. Intentional offensive touching meeting the requirements of battery as defined
supra note 65. See also, 22 ALR3d 624, 657, where the editors distinguish between the
"ordinary assault" and assault by a seaman with a wicked, evil, vicious or savage
disposition.
68. Boudoin, 348 U.S. at 340.
69. See FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 63, at 197:
Intent - Defined - Proof of
Intent ordinarily may not be proved directly because
there is no way of fathoming or scrutinizing the operations of
the human mind. But you may infer a person's intent from
surrounding circumstances. You may consider any statement
made or act done or omitted by a party whose intent is in
issue, and all other facts and circumstances which indicate his
state of mind.
You may consider it reasonable to draw the inference and
find that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of acts knowingly done or knowingly omitted. It is for
you to decide what facts have been established by the
evidence.
See also Golden v. Sommers, 56 F.R.D. 3 (M.D. Pa. 1972) aff'd, 481 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir.
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Under maritime criminal statutes for assaults, a similar distinction is made between the level of sanction imposed by examining the resulting harm to the victim. The misdemeanor crime
or what might be termed "simple assault", includes assault by
striking, beating, or wounding. 70 The felony crime or what might
be termed "aggravated assault",71 includes assault resulting in
serious bodily injury.72
1973)("reckIess" under certain circumstance may equal intent, if the evidence supports
such a finding).
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 113(d)(e) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) and 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(1)(F)(I) (Supp. IV 1986), which defines 18 U.S.C. § 113(d)(e) as misdemeanors. 18 U.S.C. §
113 states in its relevant parts:
Whoever, within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, is guilty of an assault shall be punished as follows:
(d) Assault by striking, beating, or wounding, by fine of
not more than $500 or imprisonment for not more than six
months, or both.
(e) Simple assault, by fine of not more than $300 or imprisonment for not more than three months, or both.
See also United States v. Guilbert, 692 F.2d 1340 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1016
(assault by striking, beating or wounding is the equivalent of a simple battery. No particular degree of severity in injury required, nor specific intent as required by the more
serious offenses under the section).
71. In discussing aggravated battery see LA FAVE AND SCOIT, supra note 64, at 684,
where the authors state "Although the common law created the twin crimes (misdemeanors) of assault and battery, in modem times legislatures have added the more serious
crimes (felonies) of aggravated assault and batteries (eg. assault, battery with intent to
kill ..• , assault, battery with a dangerous weapon).
The authors also state "[a]ll jurisdictions have statutes, variously worded, which define aggravated batteries and punish them as felonies [footnote]. Traditionally, the most
common statute of this type was one covering "assault [footnote] with intent to murder"
(or to kill, or to do great bodily injury, ... or commit mayhem). [d. at 688.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)-(c)(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) and 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(1)(A)(E) (Supp. IV 1986), which defines crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)-(c)(f) as felonies. 18
U.S.C. § 113(a)-(c)(f) states in its relevant part:
Whoever, within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, is guilty of an assault shall be punished as follows:
(a) Assault with intent to commit murder, by imprisonment for not more than twenty years.
(b) Assault with intent to commit any felony, except murder or a felony under chapter 109A, by fine of not more than
$3,000 or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both.
(c) Assault with a dangerous weapon, with intent to do
bodily harm, and without just cause or excuse, by fine of not
more than $1,000 or imprisonment for not more than five
years, or both.
(f) Assault resulting in serious bodily injury, by fine of not

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1988

13

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 4

14

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:1

Although a higher degree of bodily injury is not an expressed requirement of Boudoin, there are several inferences
that suggest it is. First, as a term of art, Judge Hand's "seamans' brawl" describes the common physical encounters between fighting seamen. In stating the shipowner is not liable for
every seamans' brawl, the inference is made that something
more serious must result before liability will be imposed.
Second, the Court in Boudoin uses the adjectives "wicked,
evil, savage and vicious" in describing the disposition of the assaulting seaman. An attack by an individual possessing such a
mental state again infers a serious resulting injury. Third, the
majority of case law in this area suggests that a higher degree of
physical harm must be present before liability will be imposed.73
In decisions favorable to plaintiff the injuries have generally enmore than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than ten
years, or both.
73. See, e.g., the following cases resulting in favorable decisions for plaintiff, where a
higher degree of resulting harm is found: Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336
(1955)(unprovoked attack with bottle caiIsing serious injury); Deakle v. John E. Graham
& Sons, 756 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1985)(unprovoked stabbing resulting in extended hospitalization); Pashby v. Universal Dredging Corp., 608 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1979)(attack
with 18" eyebolt causing injuries to head, leg, and hand); Calcagni v. Hudson Waterways
Corp., 630 F.2d 1049 (2d Cir. 1979)(attack with wheel wrench; plaintiff incurred various
bruises and lacerations); Smith v. Lauritzen, 356 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1966)(attack with
cargo hooks causing severe head injuries); Horton v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 326
F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1964)(unprovoked attack using broken bottle and teeth; plaintiff hospitalized); Clevenger v. Star Fish & Oyster Co., 325 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1963)(attack from
behind with spear causing punctured lung and severing two ribs); Kelcy v. Tankers Co.,
217 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1954)(plaintiff attacked by assailant, causing cut over left eye,
bloody nose, cuts" around mouth and damaged dentures); Keen v. Overseas Tankship
Corp., 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1952)(unprovoked attack with meat cleaver causing serious
head injuries); Handley v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)(stab wound
to abdomen, plaintiff hospitalized); Bartholomew v. Universe Tankers, 168 F. Supp. 155
(S.D.N.Y. 1957)(unprovoked attack with fists and feet; plaintiff trampled); Thompson v.
Coastal Oil Co., 119 F. Supp. 838 (D.N.J. 1954)(plaintiff attacked from behind with meat
cleaver; severe injuries to head).
In the following cases, plaintiff failed to establish unseaworthiness under fact patterns where lesser degrees of resulting harm was found: Lambert v. Morania Oil Tanker
Corp., 677 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1982)(assailant hit plaintiff with fists and foot); Schultz v.
Evelyn Jewell, Inc., 476 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1973)(assault on shrimp boat; no serious injury reported by the court); Kirsch v. United States, 450 F.2d 326 (9th Cir. 1971)(plaintiff struck twice with fists, was able to work rest of voyage); Boorus v. West Coast TransOceanic, 299 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1962)(fist fight between crew members; no injury seen or
reported); Stankiewicz v. United Fruit S.S. Corp., 299 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1956)(assailant
hit plaintiff with jacket zipper); Walters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 309 F.2d 191
(2d Cir. 1952)(assailant hit plaintiff with fists; no corroborated evidence of serious injury); Kuhl v. Manhattan Tankers Co., 1972 A.M.C. 236 (E.D. Va. 1972)(plaintiff claims
struck in face by chief mate, no medical attention sought).
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tailed serious injury, debilitation and or medical attention.'14
In sum, by drawing an analogy from the criminal code it
would appear that case law under the unseaworthiness claim has
grafted a type of civil "aggravated battery" into the general maritime law couched in unseaworthiness language. As such, although not directly addressed by the Court in Boudoin, a strong
inference can be made that similar to criminal aggravated assault a higher degree of resulting harm must be found before the
seaman will be found to be unequally disposed.

Caution should be exercised though in keeping the two bodies of general maritime law and criminal code separate and distinct. First, the doctrine of unseaworthiness is not controlled by
the criminal statute.'16 Additionally, the underlying principle of
criminal law is to protect the public as a whole, where the primary purpose of unseaworthiness is to compensate the individual seaman for injuries incurred.'18 However, given this cautionary note the analogy may still prove useful as a reference point
in distinguishing the "sailors' brawl" and assault by the' unequally disposed seaman, by focusing on the resulting harm.

2. The fighting seaman stereotype
A second murky area is the Jones qualification on seamen's
disposition. In Jones, the court makes two statements emphasizing the plaintiff's heavy burden in proving that the assault went
beyond the "usual and customary standards of the calling."'1'1
First, the court states that in determining the seaman's disposition it must be bore in mind that they are more easily provoked
to fight than ordinary office workers.'18 Later the opinion states
"in other decisions of this sort the assault has been either with a
weapon, or the assailant has been independently shown to have
been exceptionally quarrelsome, or worse."'19
74. See generally, supra note 73 and accompanying text.
75. On a plain reading, 18 U.S.C. § 113 has no application to the unseaworthiness
claim.
76. See generally, W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §2, at 7 (4th ed.
1971).
77. Jones, 204 F.2d at 817.
78. Id. at 817.
79. Id.
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Both statements speak to the plaintiff's heavy burden in
proving unequal disposition, but on what foundations are they
based? The latter statement cites a string of cases to back up
the proposition.so The former statement cites no statistical or
case authority. One could speculate that the statement may be a
product of an antiquated stereotype of seamen as brawlers.
Apparently, the court in Jones felt the Keen standard drifting away from the pier and decided to tightened up on the
shorelines in order to bring the vessel back alongside. Unfortunately, it seems they took in too tight on the head line (with the
fighting seaman stereotype), thus leaving the stern out in the
stream. Most courts have been able to steer clear of the hazard
created by stereotyping, hopefully recognizing its underlying intent by focusing on plaintiff's heavy burden more than the truth
of the statement itself.
As the stereotype of the fighting seaman appears based
more in fiction than fact, is it useful to retain it? Removal would
not appear to conflict with policy considerations in protecting
the. seaman's risk of loss in an inherently dangerous environment.S1 Additionally, by removing the stereotype, the equal disposition of seamen can be judged in its present day 20th Century context. S2 For these reasons the Ninth Circuit should
dismiss Judge Hand's caricature as an unfortunate choice of
words; however, his underlying intent of plaintiff's heavy burden
in proving unequal disposition should be retained.
B.

GUIDEPOSTS

Up to this point we have basically dealt with the Keen,
Jones and Boudoin trilogy that leaves us a policy, a rule, and a
brief list of factors as guidelines.
80. [d. at 817, citing Keen v. Overseas Tankship Co., 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1952);
Kyriakos v. Goulandris, 151 F.2d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1945); Koehler v. Presque-Isle Transportation Co., 141 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1944); The Rolph, 299 F. 52, 55 (9th Cir. 1924).
81. See supra notes 30 and 31.
82. For an example of how the stereotype works, see Hildebrand v. S.S. Commander, 247 F. Supp 625, 627 (E.D. Va. 1965), where the court states that the assailant
acted without "intoxicating beverages so frequently leading to the typical sailors brawl."
The publishing headnotes naturally interpreted this as a "drunken sailors brawl."
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The policy recognizes inherent hazards in the seaman's
unique work environment over which he has little controp3 The
risk of loss will pass to the shipowner for seamen's injuries resulting from hazardous conditions on board the vesseP4 The
shipowner will in turn spread the loss among the shipping industry who benefit from performance of the seaman's services under
the hazardous conditions. 85
The policy is implemented via the shipowner's warranty of
seaworthiness. Under the warranty, the shipowner has an absolute duty to provide a seaworthy vessel such that the vessel and
appurtenant gear are reasonably fit for their intended purpose.86
The warranty has been extended to include the vessel's crew
members.87 In the context of seamen, the shipowner warrants
him to be of equal disposition to other ordinary seamen of the
calling. 88
In determining whether a seaman possesses an unequal disposition at the time of the assault, thus breaching the shipowner's warranty, we are called on to distinguish between an assault within the "usual and customary standards of the calling"
and an assault by a seaman with a wicked and vicious disposition.89 A useful analogy in distinguishing the two situations may
be drawn from the criminal law distinction between "simple assault" and "aggravated assault", where the aggravated assault
requires a higher degree of resulting injury.
In Boudoin and Jones the respective courts developed a
short list of relevant factors to aide in determining whether the
assaulting seaman possessed an unequal disposition. The Supreme Court in Boudoin found factors such as violent character,
belligerent disposition, excessive drinking habits, disposed to
fighting, and making threats and assaults to be significant in determining disposition. 90 In Jones, the court suggested the use of
83. See supra notes 30 and 31 with accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 30, 31, and 39 with accompanying text.
85.Id.
86. Mahnich, 321 U.S. at 102; Mitchell, 362 U.S. at 539; Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 94-95;
Usner, 400 U.S. at 500.
87. See supra note 8.
88. Boudoin, 348 U.S. at 339.
89. Id. at 340.
90.Id.
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a weapon, exceptionally quarrelsome behavior, or worse was
needed. 91
Combining the Boudoin and Jones factors into excessive intoxication, history of prior assaults or aggressive behavior, use of
a weapon, or worse, is useful but lacking as a comprehensive list.
Fortunately, subsequent circuit decisions have fleshed out several more factors that add to the laundry list. Pulling together
and analyzing all the various cases has lead the authors to propose nine significant factors that should be examined in making
a determination of the unseaworthiness claim. The list includes;
1) provocation, 2) injury, 3) prior and subsequent acts, 4) intoxication, 5) use of a weapon, 6) physical differences, 7) selfdefense, 8) warning, and 9) conduct of superiors.
If one accepts the arguments and discussion up to this point

then the following will probably appear to be nothing more than
common sense guidelines. The proposed guideposts are by no
means exhaustive, but they do suggest some recurring themes
that the Ninth Circuit as well as other circuits have considered
important. As it is doubtful that any two assaults will occur in
the same manner, different factors may be given more or less
weight than suggested here. It is in the end a judgment call, it is
hoped the following proposed guidelines may prove helpful in
that determination.
1. Provocation. If one may infer that a person who attacks
without provocation possesses violent tendencies, then provocation may become an important factor in distinguishing between
equal and unequal disposition. In Pashby v. Universal Dredging
Corp.,92 plaintiff was assaulted in an unprovoked rear attack by
a deckhand using an 18" eyebolt.93 The court reversed summary
judgment for defendant finding that the nature of the assault
raised material issues to the claim.94

A similar result was reached in Stechcon v. United States,9"
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
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in an unprovoked attack from rear with fists. 96 Here the court
found the assault conclusively not of the "sailor's brawl" type,
and reversed summary judgment for defendant. 9 '1 In sum, a lack
of provocation would appear to be a strong inference of unequal
disposition in the Ninth Circuit. 98
On the flip side, district court decisions within the Ninth
Circuit have found that a provoking seaman should not benefit
from his own wrongdoing as evidenced in Watson v. The Letita
Lykes,99 and Palmer v. Apex Marine Corp.IOO In Watson, the
overwhelming evidence showed plaintiff provoked the fight and
the other seaman only acted in self defense. lol In Palmer, the
court dismissed plaintiff's unseaworthiness claim where the evidence showed plaintiff provoked an attack on his watch partner
who possessed no apparent propensities toward evil conduct. lo2
Additionally, where there is mutual provocation as in
Boorus v. West Coast Trans-Oceanic S.S. Line,103 and Mon96. [d. at 794.
97. [d.

98. For similar result in other circuits where little or no provocation was found, see
Deakle v. John E. Graham & Sons, 756 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1985)(unprovoked attack
from rear with a knife); Claborn v. Star Fish & Oyster Co., 578 F.2d 983 (5th Cir.
1978)(unprovoked fatal attack from rear with 10" bait knife); Horton v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 326 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1964)(unprovoked attack by assailant with
broken glass, a bottle and biting with his teeth); Hildebrand v. S.S. Commander, 247 F.
Supp. 625 (E.D. Va. 1965)(unprovoked attack by second mate on third mate after third
mate refused to stand second mate's watch); Bartholomew v. Universe Tanker, Inc., 168
F. Supp. 155, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)(unprovoked attack; assailant trampled and beat plaintiff with fists and then attempted to throw him over the side).
99. 135 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
100. 510 F. Supp. 72 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
101. Watson, 135 F. Supp. at 934.
102. Palmer, 510 F. Supp. at 73. For similar cases where evidence showed plaintiff
may have provoked attack, see Harbin v. Interlake S.S. Co., 570 F.2d 99, 104 (6th Cir.
1978)(plaintiff's provocation coupled with the fact that assailant hit him in non-vital
areas plus assailant's good record did not support a conclusion of savage disposition);
Smith v. American Mail Lines, Ltd., 525 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1975)(court speculates that
plaintiff's deceased may have provoked attack); Robinson v. 8.S. Atlantic Sterling, 369
F.2d 69, 71 (5th Cir. 1967)(plaintiff captain provoked messman into violent attack with
knife); McConville v. Florida Towing Corp., 321 F.2d 162, 164-65 (1st Cir. 1963)(court
finds plaintiff's own misconduct and provocation the sole proximate cause of his injuries); Stankiewicz v. United Fruit S.S. Corp., 229 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1956)(inference (discussed under negligence claim) that plaintiff had tied assailant's clothes in knots prior to
assailant striking plaintiff with his jacket); Kuhl v. Manhattan Tankers Co., 1972 A.M.C.
236, 239-40 (E.D. Va. 1972)(plaintiff bosun habitually drunk and argumentative provoked chief mate into hitting him).
103. 299 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1962).
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plaisir v. Delta S.S. Lines,104 the Ninth Circuit has not imposed
liability. In Boorus, plaintiff bosun filed an unseaworthiness and
negligence claim for alleged injuries resulting from a fight with
the ship's carpenter.1011 The Ninth Circuit affirmed judgment for
the shipowner where circumstance suggested both parties were
protagonists in the fight. lOS

In Monplaisir, the plaintiff was summoned before a Coast
Guard administrative hearing after a knife fight, forcing him to
leave the vessel early.l07 Plaintiff brought suit under an unseaworthiness claim for loss of wages and damages alleging that he
was wrongfully discharged. lOS The district court noted the Coast
Guard ALJ decision that found both parties to the fight willing
participants and guilty of misconduct. l09 The district court
granted summary judgment to defendant finding that plaintiff's
own misconduct was the substantial factor which lead to his discharge, and not the other party's action. llo
In addition to the general discussion of provocation above,
Jones and Boudoin remind us that in determining disposition,
seamen are more easily provoked than office workers.lll For reasons mentioned earlier the authors feel this caveat should be
dismissed. Lack of adequate provocation should be viewed in
terms of the disposition of the present day ordinary seaman,
without regard to antiquated stereotypes.
2. Injury. The seriousness and permanent nature of an injury may be a strong indication of the inflicting party's disposition. Again, drawing an analogy from criminal "aggravated assault" statutes, it appears the circuits are looking for serious
104. 1983 A.M.C. 694 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
105. Boorus, 299 F.2d at 893.
106. [d. at 894-95.
107. Monplaisir, 1983 A.M.C. at 695.
108. [d. at 694.
109. [d. at 695.
110. [d. at 698. See also Connolly v. Farrell Lines Inc., 268 F.2d 653 (lst Cir.
1959)(plaintiff accuses assailant of not paying debts in dice game; assailant charges
plaintiff; plaintiff later advances on assailant with broken bottle); Gulledge v. United
States, 1972 A.M.C. 1187 (E.D. Penn. 1972)(conflicting evidence as to who was the aggressor). See also Holmes v. Mississippi Shipping Co., 301 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 802 (1962)(self inflicted amputation of right hand due to plaintiff's own
mental delusion did not render vessel unseaworthy).
111. Jones, 204 F.2d at 817. Boudoin, 348 U.S. at 339.
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bodily injury in distinguishing between the "sailor's brawl" and
the assault committed with a "wicked and savage disposition."
However, factors such as provocation and causation may lessen
its affect. ll2
In Smith v. American Mail Line, Ltd.,1l3 plaintiff's deceased was murdered by an unknown assailant who nearly decapitated him with a fire axe. 1l4 However, because the vessel carried 12 passengers (as to which the shipowner owes no warranty
of seaworthiness) each of whom could have been the murderer,
breach of warranty was not established.1l5 However, the court
acknowledged the district court finding that the attacker had a
vicious and savage character such that it could render the ship
unseaworthy, if the assailant had been a crewmember.l16
Serious injury was also apparent in Pashby, where plaintiff
suffered severe injuries to his head, leg, and hand, after an unprovoked assault by a deck hand wielding an 18" eyebolt. ll7 The
Ninth Circuit reversed defendant's summary judgment. llS
112. See e.g., Harbin v. Interlake S.S. Co., 570 F.2d 99, 101-04 (6th Cir. 1978)(plaintiff hit on hip with pipe; evidence of provocation by the plaintiff and the assailant's good
record did not support a finding of savage disposition); Smith v. American Mail Line,
Ltd., 525 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1975)(fatal injury but plaintiff failed to establish injury
inflicted by crewmember); Robinson v. S.S. Atlantic Sterling, 369 F.2d 69, 71 (5th Cir.
1967)(plaintiff stabbed in stomach, but provoked his assailant); McConville v. Florida
Towing Corp., 321 F.2d 162, 164 (1st Cir. 1963)(intoxicated plaintiff provoked fight);
Connolly v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 268 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1959)(plaintiff advanced on assailant with broken bottle); Jones v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 204 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1954)(broken hip was not the usual result in this type of assault); Monplaisir v. Delta S.S. Lines,
1983 A.M.C. 649 (N.D. Cal. 1983)(both parties willingly entered into knife fight causing
suspension of papers); Descendia v. Hudson Waterways Corp., 1975 A.M.C. 1403, 1407
(S.D.N.Y. 1975)(cut to lower lip; plaintiff was aggressor); Gulledge v. United States, 1972
A.M.C. 1187 (E.D. Penn. 1972)(twenty-three stitches required for head cuts; strong inference of plaintiff returning to start second fight).
113. 525 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1975).
114. Id. at 1149.
115. Id.
116.Id.
117. Pashby, 608 F.2d at 1313.
118. Id. at 1314. For other cases involving serious injury, see Boudoin v. Lykes Bros.
S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336, 337 (1955)(severe head injuries, medical treatment required);
Deakle v. John E. Graham & Sons, 756 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1985)(stab wound in back
requiring 12 days hospitalization; recurring pshycological problems); Calcagni v. Hudson
Waterways Corp., 630 F.2d 1049, 1051 (2d Cir. 1979)(multiple bruises and lacerations)
Stechcon v. United States, 439 F.2d 792, 794 (9th Cir. 1971)(cut to eye requiring
stitches); Horton v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 326 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1964)(injuries
resulting from severe beating required shoreside hospitalization); Clevenger v. Star Fish
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However, where the physical injury is non-existent, unreported for a significant period of time, or only requiring slight
medical attention, the inference of unequal disposition is less. In
Watson, x-rays showed injury had occurred prior to the fight in
question and the plaintiff's unseaworthiness claim was ultimately dismissed,119 A similar result was also reached in Boorus,
where no injury was apparent or reported during the voyage. 120
In Kirsch v. United States,l21 plaintiff was hit twice but no serious injury was reported. Plaintiff was able to work the rest of
the voyage, and judgment for plaintiff was ultimately
reversed. 122
In sum, it appears the Ninth Circuit is looking for some
type of serious injury before considering breach of warranty. Additionally, for reasons stated earlier under "Analogy to criminal
aggravated assault", supra, the nature of the injury is a critically
important factor in the proper analysis of the unseaworthiness
claim.

3. Prior and subsequent acts or conditions. In proving the
unequal disposition of the assailant, prior or subsequent acts of
violence, belligerence, or excessive intoxication, may infer unequal disposition at the time of the assault. 123 The weight given
& Oyster Co., 325 F.2d 397, 398 (5th Cir. 1963)(two ribs severed and punctured lung);

Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515, 516 (2d Cir. 1952)(serious injury to
head); The Rolph, 299 F. 52 (9th Cir. 1924)(injury to eyes and permanent injury); Hildebrand v. 8.8. Commander, 247 F. 8upp. 625, 626 (E.D. Va. 1965)(front tooth knocked
out, requiring shoreside treatment); Handley v. United 8tates, 157 F. 8upp. 616, 618
(8.D.N.Y. 1962)(stab wound to abdomen; three weeks hospitalization); Thompson v.
Coastal Oil Co., 119 F. 8upp. 838, 841 (D.N.J. 1954)(near fatal blow to head; recurring
neuropsychiatric problems).
119. Watson, 135 F. 8upp. at 934.
120. Boorus, 299 F.2d at 896.
121. 450 F.2d 326 (9th Cir. 1971).
122. See also Lambert v. Morania Oil Tanker Corp., 677 F.2d 245, 247 (2d Cir.
1982)(plaintiff kicked in knee during fight); 8tankiewicz v. United Fruit 8.8. Corp., 229
F.2d 580, 581 (2d Cir. 1956)(plaintiff hit in eye with jacket zipper); Monplaisir v. Delta
8.8. Lines, 1983 A.M.C. 649 (N.D. Cal. 1983)(no physical injury pleaded); Palmer v. Apex
Marine Corp., 510 F. Supp. 72 (W.D. Wash. 1981)(finger bitten during fight); Kuhl v.
Manhattan Tankers Co., 1972 A.M.C. 238, 240 (E.D. Va. 1972)(plaintiff hit once in face
with fist; no medical attention sought or given).
123. In BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 1, at 3-257, the authors state that
"[t]he courts are somewhat reluctant, except in the most extreme cases, to allow the jury
to infer from the nature of the assault itself that the assailant had a violent disposition;
additional proof of prior acts in support thereof is usually necessary."
In addition to prior acts, subsequent acts have also been examined. See Boudoin v.
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such evidence has varied within the Ninth Circuit.
In Boorus, and Palmer, the courts found no evidence of
prior quarrelsome behavior by the assailant, ultimately ruling in
the shipowner's favor. 124 However, in Kirsch, the court found evidence of three prior fist fights and one subsequent to the assault on plaintiff, yet reversed judgment for plaintiff. 121> Then in
Stech con, where there was no evidence of quarrelsome history,
but the assailant attacked from the rear without provocation requiring stitches to the eye, summary judgment for defendant
was reversed. 126
The varying weight given prior and subsequent acts in the
above cases appears to parallel closely the severity of the injury
and lack of provocation.127 A similar trend can be observed in
other circuits where evidence of prior and subsequent acts are
introduced.128
Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336, 338 (1955)(after the assault, assailant left the vessel
against orders and was subsequently placed in irons and later discharged); Kirsch v.
United States, 405 F.2d 326, 327 (9th Cir. 1971)(assailant had history of three prior fist
fights and one subsequent to assault on plaintiff); Hildebrand v. S.S. Commander, 247
F.Supp. 625, 627 (E.D. Va. 1965)(assailant pulled knife on chief mate after assaulting
second mate).
For admission of prior and subsequent acts see generally 22 C. WRIGHT AND K GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 5242, at 487 (1978).
124. Boorus, 299 F.2d at 896. Palmer, 510 F. Supp. at 73.
125. Kirsch, 450 F.2d at 327.
126. Stechcon, 439 F.2d at 794.
127. See, e.g., Kirsch v. United States, 450 F.2d 326, 327 (9th Cir. 1971)(plaintiff
able to work rest of voyage after apparently unprovoked attack); Stechcon v. United
States, 439 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1971)(attack unprovoked, stitches to eye required); Boorus
v. WestCoast Trans-Oceanic, 299 F.2d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 1962}(both parties protagonists;
no injury reported to ship's officers); Palmer v. Apex Marine Corp., 510 F. Supp. 72, 7374 (W.D. Wash. 1981)(both protagonists; plaintiff suffered injury to finger); Watson v.
Letitia Lykes, 135 F. Supp. 933, 934 (S.D. Cal. 1955)(plaintiff the aggressor; nominal
injuries).
128. See, e.g., Lambert v. Morania Oil Tanker Corp., 677 F.2d 245, 246 (2d Cir.
1982)(assailant had minor criminal record; parties had roomed together for a week with
out complaint or incident); Harbin v. Interlake S.S. Co., 570 F.2d 99, 101 (6th Cir.
1978)(assailant was a licenced officer for twenty-six years, never a complaint, never lost
his temper, highly regarded by crew, no prior problems with plaintiff); Robinson v. S.S.
Atlantic Sterling, 369 F.2d 69, 71 (5th Cir. 1967)(assailant was a quiet, peaceful and
efficient man); Gerald v. United States Lines, 368 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1966)(no evidence of
prior violent conduct by either parties); Horton v. Moore-McCormack Lines Inc., 326
F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1964)(assailant had previously attacked and bitten another crew member); McConville v. Florida Towing Corp., 321 F.2d 162, 164 (1st Cir. 1963)(plaintiff had
struck the assailant nine months before; assailant was not quarrelsome nor prone to
fighting; had tried to avoid the fight); Walters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 309 F.2d
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Additionally, evidence of contrition has appeared in two
early Second Circuit cases as a significant mitigating act.129 Apparently, having offered apologies had some influence in concluding the assailant was of equal disposition.1 30 Although lip
service has been paid to contrition as a factor in subsequent
cases it has not reappeared as a significant factor .131

4. Intoxication. The assailant's severe drunken state in
Boudoin was one of several important factors the Court considered in upholding the unseaworthiness claim. 132 The Ninth Circuit has followed Boudoin and examined the influence of intoxicants in assault cases.
191 (2d Cir. 1962)(one prior conviction for assault in last 20 years); Connolly v. Farrell
Lines Inc., 268 F.2d 653, 655 (1st Cir. 1959)(evidence of log entry declaring assailant
unfit for duty due to intoxication; a knife was also found under his pillow but no other
indications of any problems); Stankiewicz v. United Fruit S.S. Corp., 229 F.2d 580, 581
(2d Cir. 1956)(plaintiff testified that assailant was belligerent, loud, argumentative and
started fights, including two previous ones); Kelcy v. Tankers Co., 217 F.2d 543, 544 (2d
Cir. 1954)(assailant had a prior conviction and had served time for assault with a
weapon; assailant chased the plaintiff out of the galley with a knife two days prior; after
assault the assailant threatened chief mate with ax); Jones v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 204
F.2d 815, 816 (2d Cir. 1953)(parties on friendly terms four months prior to assault; no
evidence of unusual truculence except for the assault); Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp.,
194 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1952)(plaintiff tried to submit evidence of assailant's quarrelsomeness and prior history at trial; judgment for defendant reversed and new trial ordered); Descendia v. American Export Lines, 1975 A.M.C. 1403, 1404 (S.D.N.Y.
1975)(parties had shared same quarters for three months without incident; plaintiff
placed in brig for assault); Gulledge v. United States, 1972 A.M.C. 1187, 1188 (E.D. Pa.
1972)(plaintiff said to be argumentative several hours before attack; testimony that assailant was a quiet, peaceable man, who did not argue or look for trouble); Kuhl v. Manhattan Tankers Co., 1972 A.M.C. 236, 239 (E.D. Va. 1972)(no previous problems with
chief mate on prior voyages); Fletcher v. Keystone Tankship Corp., 1970 A.M.C. 1812,
1814 (S.D. Tex. 1970)(plaintiff suffering delusion of alleged homosexual advances); Hildebrand v. S.S. Commander, 247 F. Supp. 625, 626 (E.D. Va. 1965)(assailant had previously made threatening gestures to another seaman; plaintiff had known assailant for
years with no differences); Handley v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 616, 617 (S.D.N.Y.
1958)(assailant characterized as bully with pugnacious character, who frequently displayed and threatened to use his knife; assailant had threatened other third mate and
challenged him to a fight; master testified that assailant said he would kill plaintiff if he
did not leave the vessel); Thompson v. Coastal Oil Co., 119 F. Supp. 838, 841 (D.N.J.
1954)(assailant was later convicted for the assault).
129. Walters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 309 F.2d 191, 192 (2d Cir. 1962)(assailant repented; sought to aid plaintiff by wiping his face with a towel); Jones v. Lykes
Bros. S.S. Co., 204 F.2d 815, 817 (2d Cir. 1953)(assailant showed contrition after beating
plaintiff).
130. Jones, 204 F.2d at 817; Walters, 309 F.2d at 192-94.
131. See Hildebrand v. S.S. Commander, 247 F. Supp. 625, 628 (E.D. Va. 1965),
where contrition listed as a factor.
132. Boudoin, 348 U.S. at 338.
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In Boorus, evidence was introduced that the assailant was
intoxicated at the time of the assault. 133 However, plaintiff failed
to substantially corroborate the evidence and the court ultimately affirmed judgment for defendant. 134 In Stechcon, noting
among other factors an absence of intoxication, the court reversed summary judgment for defendant. 13 C> In Palmer, the bosun's drunkenness was found not to be the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injuries. 136
However, in the case of heavy or excessive intoxication,
Boudoin and other circuit decisions have found a strong inference of unequal disposition. The court in Handley v. United
States/ 37 found the assailant had consumed 4 to 6 scotches
before stabbing the plaintiff on a dock. 13s In Claborn v. Star
Fish & Oyster CO./39 the assailant had been drinking heavily for
several days causing the captain to tie him to the stern shortly
before his fatal attack on plaintiff's deceased with a 10" bait
knife. l4O The court found the vessel unseaworthy as a matter of
law. l41
Although intoxication has been examined by the Ninth Circuit it has yet to be utilized as a strong indication of unequal
disposition. Boudoin and some circuit decisions suggest that
heavy or excessive intoxication is needed before it becomes a significant factor.142 Smaller amounts of alcohol consumed prior to
an assault appear to carry little weight. l43
133. Boorus, 299 F.2d at 894.
134. Id. at 897.
135. Stechcon, 439 F.2d at 794.
136. Palmer, 510 F. Supp. at 74.
137. 157 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
138. Id. at 618.
139. 578 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 1978).
140. Id. at 984-85.
141. Id. at 987.
142. Boudoin, 348 U.S. at 337. See also McConville v. Florida Towing Corp., 321
F.2d 162, 164 (1st Cir. 1963)(assailant was heavily intoxicated at time of assault); Keen v.
Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515, 516 (2d Cir. 1952)(assailant drunk when assaulted plaintiff with a meat cleaver); Montanez v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 1972
A.M.C. 1251, 1252 (E.D. Pa. 1972)(assailant visibly intoxicated).
143. For cases dealing with smaller amounts of alcohol see Lambert v. Morania Oil
Tanker Corp., 677 F.2d 245, 246 (2d Cir. 1982)(assailant had consumed a couple beers
ashore prior to assault); Gerald v. United States Lines, 368 F.2d 343, 344 (2d Cir.
1966)(assailant and possibly plaintiff had been drinking beer prior to assault); Jones v.
Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 204 F.2d 815, 816 (2d Cir. 1953)(assailant and plaintiff each had a
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5. Weapons. The Ninth Circuit as well as the Supreme
Court and other circuits have consistently viewed the use of
dangerous or deadly weapons as a critical factor in determining
unseaworthiness. 144 Plaintiff's deceased in Smith v. American
Mail Line, was fatally attacked with fire ax, but plaintiff could
not establish that a crewmember was the assailant. l45 Judgment
for defendant was affirmed. l4S In Pashby, the assailant attacked
plaintiff from the rear with an 18" eyebolt causing severe injuries. 147 Defendant's summary judgment was reversed. l4S Also,
even where an instrument is used in the everyday work place it
may be viewed as a weapon depending on the manner of use. 149
can of beer earlier in the evening); Gulledge v. United States, 1972 A.M.C. 1187, 1188
(E.D. Pa. 1972)(some evidence of prior intoxication, but several hours before).
144. See, e.g., Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U$. 336, 337 (1955)(assailant
attacked plaintiff with a bottle); Deakle v. John E. Graham & Sons, 756 F.2d 821, 824
(11th Cir. 1985)(stabbed in back); Calcagni v. Hudson Waterways Corp., 630 F.2d 1049,
1051 (2d Cir. 1979)(assailant hit plaintiff with wheel wrench); Claborn v. Star Fish &
Oyster Co., 578 F.2d 983, 985 (5th Cir. 1978)(fatal stabbing with 10" bait knife); Harbin
v. Interlake S.S. Co., 570 F.2d 99, 102 (6th Cir. 1978)(assault with pipe); Robinson v.
Atlantic Sterling, 369 F.2d 69, 70 (5th Cir. 1967)(plaintiff stabbed in stomach with
knife); Gerald v. United States Lines, 368 F.2d 343, 344 (2d Cir. 1966)(assailant attacked
with knife; plaintiff knocked assailant out with a piece of dunnage); Smith v. ,Lauritzen,
356 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1966)(assailant attacks plaintiff with cargo hooks); Horton v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 326 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1964)(assailant attacked plaintiff
with a bottle, broken glass and his teeth); Clevenger v. Star Fish & Oyster Co., 325 F.2d
397, 398 (5th Cir. 1963)(attack with a steel bar 4'x I" with sharp point); McConville v.
Florida Towing Corp., 321 F.2d 162, 164 (1st Cir. 1963)(alleged assailant defended himself with an "iron dog"); Connolly v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 268 F.2d 653, 655 (1st Cir.
1959)(assailant hit plaintiff over the head with a plank while plaintiff was advancing on
him with a broken bottle); Stankiewicz v. United Fruit S.S. Corp., 229 F.2d 580, 581 (2d
Cir. 1956)(assailant hits plaintiff in eye with zipper attached to jacket); Keen v. Overseas
Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515, 516 (2d Cir. 1952)(assailant assaults plaintiff with meat
cleaver); Monplaisir v. Delta S.S. Lines, 1983 A.M.C. 694, 695 (N.D. Cal. 1983)(assault
with knife, but plaintiff is proximate cause of his own injury); Descendia v. American
Export Lines, 1975 A.M.C. 1403, 1405 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)(plaintiff slashed alleged assailant's hand with scissors); Gulledge v. United States, 1972 A.M.C. 1187, 1190 (E.D. Pa.
1972)(plaintiff claims assailant hit him over the head with a coffee mug); Handley v.
United States, 157 F. Supp. 616, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)(assailant stabbed plaintiff with
knife); Thompson v. Coastal Oil Co., 119 F. Supp. 838, 841 (D.N.J. 1954)(attack with
meat cleaver).
145. Smith v. American Mail Line, 525 F.2d at 1149.
146. [d. at 1151.
147. Pashby, 608 F.2d at 1313.
148. [d. at 1314.
149. See generally Smith v. Lauritzen, 356 F.2d 171, 177 (3d Cir. 1966)(focus is on
the dangerous nature of the instrument (cargo hooks) when used as a weapon); Gulledge
v. United States, 1972 A.M.C. 1187 (E.D. Pa. 1972)(plaintiff alleges a coffee mug was
used to committ assault causing twenty-three stitches to his head).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol18/iss1/4

26

Cavin and Rush: Admiralty Law

1988]

ADMIRALTY LAW

27

The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have ruled under certain
circumstances, an assault with a weapon may render the vessel
unseaworthy as a matter of law. In the Fifth Circuit case of
Clevenger v. Star Fish & Oyster CO./50 the mate who was in
command of the vessel during unloading operations savagely
plunged a 4' x 1" sharpened "devils fork," into the back of
deckhand after an exchange of words. 151 The assault punctured a
lung and severed two ribs. 152 Reversing the district court ruling
for defendant, the court held, as a matter of law, the vessel to be
unseaworthy.153
Several years later the Fifth Circuit in Claborn, again ruled
the vessel unseaworthy as a matter of law.1M In Claborn, a delirious deckhand in an extraordinarily savage and unprovoked attack fatally stabbed plaintiff's deceased in the back with a 10"
bait knife. 155 The Fifth Circuit reversed a lower court judgment
for defendant finding the facts demonstrated the assailant to be
unequally disposed, thus breaching the shipowner's warranty of
seaworthiness as matter of law. 15s
More recently the Eleventh Circuit in Deakle v. John E.
Graham & Sons/ 57 ruled that the facts established the vessel
unseaworthy as a matter of law. 158 In Deakle, the assailant
deckhand apparently went berserk stabbing the captain in the
back in an unprovoked attack. 159 The plaintiff was granted a directed verdict and defendant appealed. ISO The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the lower court ruling finding the vessel unseaworthy as
a matter of law. lSI
6. Physical differences. A more subtle distinction examined
by the Ninth Circuit and other circuits are physical differences
150. 325 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1963).
151. Id. at 398.
152.Id.
153. Id. at 402-03.
154. Claborn, 578 F.2d at 987.
155. Id. at 985.
156. Id. at 987. See also Pashby v. Universal Dredging Corp., 608 F.2d 1312, 1314
(9th Cir. 1979), citing to Claborn, 578 F.2d. at 987.
157. 756 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1985).
158. Id. at 826.
159. Id. at 824.
160.Id.
161. Id. at 826.
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including age and size, between the assailant and victim. In
Stechcon, the assailant, who attacked from the rear without
warning was 75 lbs. heavier than his victim. 162 Considering the
weight disparity along with the unprovoked nature of the attack
and injury to the eye, the reviewing court ultimately reversed
defendant's summary judgment.163
The Second Circuit in Kelcy v. Tankers Corp.,164 found the
trial court's ruling on unseaworthiness was justified noting the
plaintiff was 56 years old and no match physically against his 25
year old assailant. 16l1 In Harbin v. Interlake S.S. CO./66 plaintiff
was 47 years old at 6'1", 215 Ibs.167 His alleged assailant, 38
years old, was shorter and lighter. 16B In reversing plaintiff's judgment, the Sixth Circuit in addition to other considerations, appeared to use age and size as offsetting factors.169
In sum, when age or size is examined as a significant factor
the differences have been substantial,l1° However, it is apparent
that some caution should be exercised in the amount of weight
given such differences as a smaller, older person may be equally
capable of viciously assaulting a fellow crew member.

7. Self-defense. Generally, the focus of the affirmative defense of self defense is on the reasonableness of the force used to
repel. l7l The Ninth Circuit as well as other circuits have also
162. Stechcon, 439 F.2d at 794. See also The Rolph, 229 F. 52 (9th Cir. 1924)(assailant was a large and powerful man).
163. Id. at 794.
164. 217 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1954).
165. Id. at 543 n.4.
166. 570 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1978).
167. Id. at 101.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 101-04.
170. For cases in other circuits where size and weight have been considered, see
Lambert v. Morania Oil Tanker Corp., 677 F.2d 245, 247 (2d Cir. 1982)(plaintiff 6'3", 275
lbs.; assailant 5'8",145 lbs.); Walters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 309 F.2d 191, 192
(2d Cir. 1962)(plaintiff 30 lbs. lighter than assailant); McConville v. Florida Towing
Corp., 321 F.2d 162, 164 (1st Cir. 1963)(alleged assailant a much smaller man; court concludes plaintiff was aggressor); Handley v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y.
1958)(assailant 6'2", 250 lbs.; plaintiff 5'7", 170 lbs.).
171. See FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 65 at § 81.02, at 197:
Self-Defense - Burden of Proof on Defendant
In addition to denying that any assault or battery by the
defendant proximately caused injury to the plaintiff, the defendant alleges that any act or conduct of the defendant which
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focused on the plaintiff's lack of self defense as a factor, significantly where the assailant continues his attack.172
In Stechcon, plaintiff offered no defense to an unprovoked
rear attack. I73 Considering all relevant factors the circuit court
reversed defendant's summary judgment.174 However, in Kirsch,
the circuit court reversed judgment for plaintiff even though he
offered no defense to an assault by the third assistant
engineer. I7l1
may have caused any injury or damage to the plaintiff, at the
time and place alleged, was committed or done following an
unprovoked assault by the plaintiff upon the person of the
defendant.
A person upon whom an unprovoked assault is being
made, or who has reasonable ground for believing, and does
believe, that another person is about to inflict bodily injury
upon him, need not retreat, but may stand his ground and defend the integrity of his person; and where in such self-defense
of his person he injures his assailant, the law holds there is
legal justification, provided he used no more or greater force
or means than he in fact believed to be reasonably necessary,
and would appear to a reasonable person, under like circumstance, to be necessary, in order to prevent bodily injury to
himself.
Self-defense is an affirmative defense to the plaintiff's
claim, and the burden of proving this defense, by a preponderance of the evidence in the case, is on the defendant.
See also Lambert v. Morania Oil Tanker Corp., 677 F.2d 245, 247 (2d Cir. 1982)(plaintiff
forces off his aggressor); Robinson v. S.S. Atlantic Sterling, 369 F.2d 69, 70 (5th Cir.
1967)(plaintiff drew pistol and fired on his assailant after stabbing); Smith v. Lauritzen,
356 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1966)(assailant claims self defense in attacking plaintiff with
cargo hooks after verbal exchange); Gerald v. United States Lines, 368 F.2d 343, 344 (2d
Cir. 1966)(plaintiff knocked assailant out with piece of dunnage after being slashed with
a knife); Connolly v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 268 F.2d 653, 654 (1st Cir. 1959)(plaintiff armed
himself with a broken bottle and advanced on alleged assailant); Gulledge v. United
States, 1972 A.M.C. 1187, 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1972)(assailant claimed he hit plaintiff once
with coffee mug in self defense); Fletcher v. Keystone Tankship Corp., 1970 A.M.C. 1812,
1813 (S.D. Tex. 1970)(no justification for fatally shooting alleged assailant).
172. See Stechcon v. United States, 439 F.2d 792, 794 (9th Cir. 1971)(plaintiff offered no defense to unprovoked attack); Bartholomew v. Universe Tankers, Inc., 168 F.
Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)(no defense to beating); Thompson v. Coastal Oil Co., 119 F.
Supp. 838 (D. N.J. 1954)(no defense to attack with meat cleaver).
However, in some cases even where there is a lack of self-defense, ultimate judgment
in shipowner's favor has been granted. See Kirsch v. United States, 450 F.2d 326, 327
(9th Cir. 1971)(plaintiff did not try to strike back after being hit by his assailant); Walters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 326 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1964)(no defense to beating by
larger man).
173. Stechcon, 439 F.2d at 794.
174. [d. at 795.
175. Kirsch, 450 F.2d at 327.
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The different results in Stech con and Kirsch could perhaps
again be better explained by the nature of the resulting injury.
In Kirsch, no apparent medical attention was necessary and he
was able to work the rest of the voyage. I'16 In Stechcon, plaintiff
received injury to his eye requiring medical attention and
stitches. I'1'1 Therefore, within the Ninth Circuit a lack of self defense may be view as a weightier factor depending on the seriousness of the injury.

8. Warning. Closely related to provocation and self-defense,
is the issue of lack of warning by the assailant before attack. A
lack of warning prior to attack would appear to be a strong inference of a violent nature. In Stechcon, the assailant attacked
without warning from the rear causing injury to the eye.l'1S In
Pashby, the assailant attacked without warning from the rear
with an 18" eyebolt causing severe injury.I'19 In both cases defendant's summary judgment was reversed. ISO Other circuits
have also used a lack of warning as a factor in determining
disposition. lsl
Naturally, expressed warnings are also viewed as significant
evidence of disposition as found in Handley and Calcagni v.
Hudson Waterways Corp.182 In Handley, the district court considered evidence that the assailant told the master he would kill
plaintiff if the plaintiff did not leave the ship. ISS The assailant
subsequently stabbed the plaintiff on the pier.184 Viewing the to176. Id. at 327.
. 177. Stechcon, 439 F.2d at 794.
178. Id. at 794.
179. iPashby, 608 F.2d at 1313.
180. iStechcon, 439 F.2d at 795; Pashby, 608 F.2d at 1314.
181. See, e.g., Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955)(plaintiff awoke
and was attacked with bottle in unprovoked and sudden assault); Deakle v. John E. Graham & Sons, 756 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1985)(unprovoked rear attack with knife; no warning); Clevenger v. Star Fish & Oyster Co., 325 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1970)(rear attack with
"devils fork"; no defense); Jones v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 204 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1953)(sudden assault; no apparent provocation other than verbal exchange several hours earlier;
judgment for plaintiff reversed); Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.
1952)(rear attack with meat cleaver; no apparent warning); Hildebrand v. S.S. Commander, 247 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Va. 1965)(sudden unprovoked attack; no warning);
Thompson v. Coastal Oil Co., 119 F. Supp. 838, 841 (D. N.J. 1954)(rear attack with meat
cleaver; no warning; no defense).
182. 603 F.2d 1049, 1051 (2d Cir. 1979).
183. Handley, 157 F. Supp. at 617-19.
184. Id. at 617.
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tality of the circumstances, the court concluded that the assailant possessed an unequal disposition.1 81>
A similar result is seen in Calcagni, where the assailant, the
third engineer, threatened to kill plaintiff while chasing him up
a ladder and striking him with a wheel wrench. 186 On appeal the
Second Circuit found the trial court was not in error for submitting the unseaworthiness claim to the jury.18?
9. Conduct of officers. Case law from other circuits suggest
the conduct of superiors should be of a higher caliber than the
ordinary crew. 188 This seems a reasonable enough proposition
considering the power that superiors possess aboard the
vessel. l89

In the Ninth Circuit, superior/inferior positions have been
examined as a factor in the unseaworthiness claim. Affirming
judgment for defendant, the court in Boorus noted plaintiff bosun had no authority over the carpenter, his alleged assailant. 190
However, analysis utilizing this factor has not been consistent.
In Kirsch, the third assistant engineer assaulted the chief steward. 191 In reversing plaintiff's judgment, the reviewing court
never analyzed the assailant's position as a licensed officer. 192
Cases from the Fourth and Fifth Circuits suggest that
superiors should be held to a higher standard of conduct. In
Clevenger, emphasis was placed on the commanding position of
the assailant at the time of assault in finding the vessel was un185. [d. at 618.
186. Calcagni, 603 F.2d at 1051-52. See also Claborn v. Star Fish & Oyster Co., 578
F.2d 983, 984 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978) (assailant stated that plaintiff's decedent was "one of
them" as he grabbed for the bait knife, which was taken away).
187. [d. at 1051.
188. See Claborn v. Star Fish & Oyster Co., 578 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1978)(agreeing with the reasoning of Clevenger that the command position implies a higher stand of
conduct); Clevenger v. Star Fish & Oyster Co., 325 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1963)(mate was
commanding officer at time of his assault on deck hand); Hildebrand v. S.S. Commander,
247 F. Supp. 625, 628 (E.n. Va. 1965)(Uwe think that other officers and members of a
crew of a vessel have the right to expect that the character and behavior of an officer will
be somewhat better than that of an ordinary seaman").
189. See supra note 30.
190. Boorus, 299 F.2d at 894.
191. Kirsch, 450 F.2d at 327.
192. [d.
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seaworthy as a matter of law. 193 Similarly, in Hildebrand v. S.S.
Commander,194 where the third mate assaulted the second mate
in an unprovoked attack, the district court stated "[i]n short, we
think that other officers and members of a crew of a vessel have
the right to expect that the character and behavior of an officer
will be somewhat better than that of an ordinary seaman. m91>
Although the Ninth Circuit as well as other circuits have
shown inconsistencies in the examination of superiors assaulting
inferiors, the reasoning of Clevenger and Hildebrand appear
sound and should be applied in a consistent manner within the
Ninth Circuit.196
IV. CONCLUSION
Although advances in modern ship design have made vessels
more comfortable, nothing has changed their character as floating steel islands. By tradition and necessity most seamen are
locked into an inherently hazardous environment over which
they have little control. The admiralty courts have long recognized these hazardous conditions and have sought to protect the
seaman's risk of loss under certain conditions through the doctrine of unseaworthiness. The doctrine will impose strict liability
on the shipowner for injuries resulting from defects in the vessel
including a defective crew member. In determining if a seaman
is defective we must distinguish between the equally and unequally disposed seaman.
In attempting to clarify the issues arising in determination
of the unseaworthiness claim for assault, the authors set forth
193. Clevenger, 325 F.2d at 398. See also supra note 188 and accompanying text.
194. 247 F. Supp. 625, 628 (E.D. Va. 1965).
195. Id. at 628.
196. For fact situations or discussion of officers assaulting fellow crew members in
other circuits, see Calcagni v. Hudson Waterways Corp., 630 F.2d 1049, 1051 (2d Cir.
1979)(third assistant assaults crew member with wrench); Claborn v. Star Fish & Oyster
Co., 578 F.2d 983, 986 (5th Cir. 1978)(a higher command position will invoke a higher
standard of conduct); Clevenger v. Star Fish & Oyster Co., 325 F.2d 397, 398 (5th Cir.
1963)(mate assaults deck hand with "devils fork"); Handley v. United States, 157 F.
Supp. 616, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)(assault between licensed officers, judgment for plaintiff
affirmed). But see Harbin v. Interlake S.S. Co., 570 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1978)(second assistant allegedly assaults fireman; court appears to discount their relative positions, focuses
on assailant's good record and reputation instead).
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two preliminary suggestions. First, an analogy to aggravated assault may be drawn in focusing attention not only on the mental
state or disposition of the seaman, but also the nature of the
resulting physical injury incurred by the victim. Case law suggests that a strong inference of unseaworthiness may be drawn
where serious bodily injury is found.
Second, recognizing that the plaintiff has a heavy burden in
establishing that a fellow crewmember is of unequal disposition,
Judge Hand's unfortunate caricature of fighting seamen should
be discarded in judging the equal disposition of today's seaman.
The stereotype of fighting seamen adds nothing objective in attempting to reach a rational determination and only serves to
confuse the issues at hand.
From a comprehensive analysis of the relevant case law the
authors suggest using the proposed guideposts as a checklist in
reviewing individual circumstances of the case. Decisions in this
area suggests that serious bodily injury or death, lack of justifiable provocation, and use of a weapon are extremely weighty factors to consider. The authors propose that the Ninth Circuit
should adopt the reasoning of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in
ruling a vessel unseaworthy as a matter of law where the above
three factors are found in combination.
In addition to the remaining factors of prior and subsequent
acts, intoxication, physical differences, and warning, the Ninth
Circuit should focus particular attention on the conduct of
licenced officers when assaulting fellow crewmembers. Licensed
officers hold a commanding position and nearly absolute authority over unlicensed seamen in the closed ship board environment. Penalties for disobedience can be severe. As such, the
Ninth Circuit should consistently hold licensed officers to a
higher standard of conduct in determining equal disposition.

In sum, the authors have attempted to chart out a few recognized landmarks or guideposts with suggested aids in navigating the unseaworthiness claim for assaults between crew members. In addition, the prudent navigator should always consider
any local conditions or circumstances that might affect his position before setting the course.
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